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1. Introduction 
 
There is little doubt about the salience of the unemployment problem in the political 
agenda across the OECD countries. The sharp economic crisis suffered by the advanced 
capitalist countries during the early nineties has brought about, with very few exceptions, an 
important rise in unemployment rates across countries. In such a context, there has been an 
intense debate about the need to reform labour market regulations in order to make them 
more efficient. The policy packages implemented across countries have varied widely and 
they are well documented (for instance, Esping Andersen and Regini, 2000). What these 
different reforms have in common is that they pretend to reconcile competitive capitalism 
with social justice. This involves the general experience of potential constraints on 
unemployment benefits for citizens. 
 
Some authors have studied the extent to which these policy changes have any impact on 
public opinion. International attitude survey data have provided consistent evidence on the 
general approval of welfare state spending in the nineties (Svallfors, 1997; and 1999; Taylor-
Gooby, 2001). There seems to be, however, different patterns of support depending on the 
type of services and programmes that Welfare states provide to their citizens. In short, 
comprehensive and universal benefits such as health care and pensions enjoy much more 
popularity than targeted programmes such as unemployment benefits. (Taylor Gooby, 1996). 
The main differences pointed out in the previous literature pertains to citizens’ individual 
characteristics: their political ideology (those of the left being more prone to support 
redistribution) and their self- interest in regard to the given programme or service (young 
people being keener on education, older people on pensions and health care). (Taylor-Gooby, 
2004). These differences in public opinion on Welfare state’s programmes and services might 
have important implications for policy change, since they limit the capacity of politicians to 
implement potential reforms, and this might be especially true for the case of targeted 
policies, such as unemployment benefits. 
 
This article analyses comparative data for the last half of the nineties to investigate the 
determinants of individual and cross national variation in public support for cuts in 
unemployment benefits spending. We consider public opinion on unemployment benefits 
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retrenchment as a product not only of individual level characteristics but also of national-
level features. With very few exceptions (for instance, Blekesaumen and Quadagno, 2003), 
the latter features have traditionally been limited by previous studies to the institutional 
characteristics of welfare policies across countries. What, however, is the process by which 
the institutional characteristics of the welfare state influence public opinion? In this article, 
we provide two causal mechanisms that potentially account for the capacities of welfare 
policies to shape public opinion by systematically considering cross-country variations in the 
seriousness of the unemployment problem, and the generosity of unemployment protection. 
Even if the results are tentative, we believe they open the “black box of welfare types” that 
until very recently has been the predominant explanation when accounting for aggregated 
variation in public opinion on welfare states.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the 
existing literature on the individual and contextual factors explaining public support for 
Welfare states. Then we present the data and methods that we have employed in the empirical 
analysis. We discuss how we have operationalised the dependent variable, i.e. public support 
for cuts in unemployment benefits spending, and the independent variables, both at the 
individual and contextual level. Next, we present the results of the empirical analysis. In the 
last section we draw some tentative conclusions and discuss the main implications of our 
findings for the comparative welfare state literature.  
 
 
 
2. Individual and contextual determinants of support for cuts in unemployment benefits 
spending. Theoretical expectations 
 
The literature has traditionally explained attitudes toward social policies as a product of 
two main individual factors: citizens’ ideology, and self interests (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 
1989). We will briefly explain these two general factors in regard to unemployment benefits.  
 
With regard to self-interest, individuals who do not directly (or potentially) benefit 
from unemployment protection in the near future or do not expect to do so, will show a much 
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higher degree of support for a reduction in the level of unemployment benefits spending than 
those who are more at risk of being unemployed. Who are these citizens? If we focus on their 
socio-demographic features, the following individual factors emerge. First, gender: empirical 
evidence has demonstrated that (in general terms) women are more at risk of being 
unemployed, except for the Scandinavian countries whose welfare states have promoted 
active employment policies addressed to women’s participation in the labour market (Esping 
Andersen, 1999). Hence, we expect men to show a higher degree of support for cuts in 
unemployment benefits spending than women. Second, if we look at the age of individuals, 
two main groups are more at risk of being unemployed: young people in the process of 
transition to adulthood (especially for welfare regimes with highly regulated labour markets), 
and the older unskilled labour force in general. Therefore, the expectation here is that the 
medium-age and skilled labour force will show a higher level of support for a reduction in the 
level of unemployment benefits spending than the young and unskilled labour force.  
 
Third, people are expected to increase their level of support for unemployment benefits’ 
retrenchment as their level of income increases, since they tend to be less willing to pay taxes 
(Shivo and Usitalo, 1995). Fourth, level of education may also help to identify individual 
propensity to support or reject targeted welfare programmes. The expectation here is that as 
individuals’ level of education increases, their level of support for a reduction in the level of 
unemployment benefits spending also increases, since the chances of being unemployed 
diminishes as education rises. Finally, labour market position may also affect citizens’ 
propensity to support or reject cuts in unemployment benefits spending. Those unemployed 
or with a member of their family unemployed will be less prone to support unemployment 
benefits’ retrenchment. Summarizing, those individuals that look more like potential 
consumers of unemployment transfers will show a lower propensity to support a reduction in 
levels of unemployment benefits spending. (Andreb and Hein, 2001). 
 
The second potential factor that may influence citizens’ propensity to support 
unemployment benefits retrenchment is ideology. The literature agrees that welfare politics 
are historically structured between political right and left (Taylor Gooby, 2001). In short, left-
wing citizens tend to be more supportive of the welfare state in general, and of targeted 
programmes in particular, than conservative people. There is abundant evidence showing that 
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welfare state sympathies are stronger among left-wing electors than among others groups of 
citizens (Groskind, 1994; Shivo and Usitalo, 1995). In sum, right-wing citizens are expected 
here to present the highest level of support for unemployment benefits retrenchment.  
 
Besides these individual differences, there are some structural and institutional features 
of each nation that may help to explain cross-country differences in support for the welfare 
state. Among those factors, the most widely mentioned in the literature is the type of welfare 
state (Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Bloomberg and Kroll, 1999; Edlund, 1999; Forma, 1997; 
Svallfors, 1997). There seems to be an agreement on the influence of the characteristics of the 
Welfare state on citizens’ attitudes and opinions. Very briefly, the literature argues that the 
historical role of the state in each country is a relevant factor in shaping public opinion 
towards different social policies. There are, however, several problems with this line of 
research. The first is empirical: there is abundant evidence showing that underdeveloped 
Welfare states such as Southern Europe countries present similar levels of Welfare state 
support to the Scandinavian countries (Svallfors, 1999; Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby, 1999).  
 
The second problem is more theoretical and has already been raised by other authors 
(Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003). It concerns the causal mechanism linking the historical 
role of the state with public attitudes. The reverse causation could be another plausible 
hypothesis. That is, public opinion can also influence politicians or institutions. There is an 
abundant literature demonstrating that public opinion affect public policy (Page and Shapiro, 
1992; Stimson, Mackuen & Eriksson, 1995). 1 
 
The third problem concerns the explanation of the process by which the institutional 
characteristics of the welfare state may shape public opinion. Previous literature has shown 
that there is a significant incidence of welfare state type on public opinion towards social 
policies. This empirical evidence, however, is only an indicator of subgroup differences, but 
it does not explain the mechanism through which this effect is produced. In short, the type of 
welfare regime often appears as a “black box” with scarce explanations of the causal 
mechanisms that might influence individuals at the macro level. Hence, we argue that it is 
                                               
1 Stimson et al, 1995 argue for the existence of what they call “dynamic representation” in which 
politicians are aware of modifications in public opinion and adjust their behaviour accordingly.  
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necessary to consider other macro-level factors if we aspire to understand the causal 
mechanisms thorough which welfare states might shape public opinion on unemployment 
benefits across OECD countries.  
 
One of the most important dimensions used to identify types of welfare regimen is that 
of decommodification which can be defined as the capacity of welfare states to reduce the 
market dependence of their citizens (Esping-Andersen, 1990). For the case of unemployment 
benefits, this capacity can be measured as the generosity and scope of unemployment benefits 
across countries. We propose to consider this dimension to better account for the relationship 
between welfare policies and public opinion. What, however, should be expected about the 
potential relationship between the generosity of the unemployment benefits and public 
opinion? There are two lines of thinking that simultaneously suggest the same expectation: 
As the generosity of unemployment benefits increase, a higher degree of public support for 
cuts in unemployment protection’ spending at the aggregated level is expected. The logic 
behind this is the old liberal adage that unemployment benefits should be low enough so as to 
give unemployed people incentives to look for jobs. Additionally, the generosity of social 
transfers implies a higher degree of taxes, and hence a lack of enthusiasm of employed 
citizens to pay taxes in order to finance unemployment benefits. 
 
This constitutes, nevertheless, no more than one part of the story. The other regards the 
seriousness of the social problem that unemployment protection is intended to solve or, at 
least, to alleviate. In this case, we refer to the seriousness of the unemployment problem. The 
inclination of some citizens to support a reduction in the level of unemployment benefits’ 
spending because they find them too generous might potentially be compensated by their 
consciousness of the problem of unemployment. Put differently, persistently high levels of 
unemployment should be negatively associated with greater levels of public support for cuts 
in unemployment benefits’ spending. Therefore, the expectation here is to find higher levels 
of support for unemployment benefits retrenchment in countries where the unemployment 
problem fluctuates across time and is less dramatic than in countries where the magnitude of 
the unemployment problem is salient and persistent across time. When the unemployment 
problem is persistent, it seems more difficult to argue that the responsibility for being 
unemployed is placed on the individual. Hence, at the aggregated level, citizens are expected 
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to have more concern for those unemployed since the risk of becoming unemployed is greater 
in the country as a whole, independently of their own individual characteristics. 
 
We propose to operationalise these two distinctive features of unemployment protection 
that might influence public opinion in the following way. With regards to the generosity of 
unemployment benefits, several potential indicators could measure this concept. The most 
standard way to measure the generosity of unemployment compensation is through public 
expenditure on unemployment compensation as a percentage of GDP. This measure, 
however, is problematic because it ignores cross national variation in the duration and 
coverage of benefits. These dimensions should be considered if we want to understand the 
extent to which unemployment benefits are protecting citizens from the risk of poverty when 
they lose their job.  
 
We have developed an index of unemployment generosity by considering the two 
aforementioned dimensions of unemployment protection. This index is the average value for 
each country of the two following indicators. On the one hand, and in order to get an idea 
about the scope of unemployment benefits, we have taken the replacement ratio as given by 
the OECD, and expressed as a percentage (OECD Employment Outlook, 1997). 2On the other 
hand, we have computed the maximum period for which full benefits are typically available 
to unemployed people (measured in months). Concerning the seriousness of the 
unemployment problem, the most relevant macro-economic indicator to measure is surely the 
rate of unemployment.  
 
In sum, public opinion about cuts in levels of unemployment benefits spending might 
be shaped by some contextual factors that equally affect citizens sharing the same political 
system, and controlling for their distinctive individual characteristics. Among these factors, 
we propose to systematically consider not only the type of welfare regime in which citizens 
reside but also the generosity of unemployment benefits, together with the seriousness of the 
unemployment problem that those benefits aspire to alleviate.  
 
                                               
2 The reference wage is defined as gross wages and even if it is not defined in exactly the same way 
across countries, they are comparable.  
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So far, we have discussed the individual and contextual factors that will potentially help 
us to explain cross-national variation in public support for cuts in unemployment benefits 
spending. We now turn to the explanation of the empirical analysis carried out in order to test 
the theoretical expectations already described. 
 
 
 
3. Data, variables and methods  
 
We use data from the survey conducted within the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP). It was conducted in 1996 / 7, and constitutes the third wave of the series on “The 
Role of the Governments”. This survey contains information about individuals’ views on 
welfare state intervention in the economy, reforms, and retrenchment. At the same time, it 
contains enough socio-demographic information as to allow us to test some of the hypotheses 
at the individual level. It also contains information about twenty-three countries. However, 
we have restricted the analysis to 13 OECD countries, since the theoretical discussion 
summarized in previous section refers only to advanced capitalist countries.3 
 
With regard to the dependent variable, we have operationalized the degree of public 
support for unemployment benefits, using people’s opinions about government spending on 
unemployment benefits. More specifically, the interviewees were asked the following 
question: “Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you 
would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say 
‘much more’, it might require a tax increase to pay for it: More or less government spending 
for: Unemployment benefits: 1. Spend much more 2. Spend more 3. Spend the same as now 
4. Spend less 5.Spend much less” 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of the responses across countries. It provides the 
percentage of respondents in three main categories: spend more (which groups categories 1 
                                               
3 The countries considered in the analysis are: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States. The rest of the sample corresponds to 
former East European Communist countries. 
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and 2 of the original question), the same (that corresponds to the third category), or less 
(which groups categories 4 and 5). 
 
Various features emerge from Figure 1. First, at the aggregated level there is a high 
degree of empirical variation in the proportion of respondents for the categories that clearly 
correspond to support and rejection for unemployment benefits. Moreover, the coefficient of 
variation for the aggregated distribution of each of the two categories expressed as a 
percentage is of 47% and 50% respectively. In contrast, the medium category (“the same”) 
presents a lower degree of empirical variation across countries with a coefficient of variation 
equal to 18%4 
 
Which, however, are the countries presenting a higher degree of public support for 
unemployment benefits retrenchment? New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and France present 
percentages higher than 30%, whereas Great Britain, the USA, Italy, and Norway, 
percentages around 20%. Spain and Japan present the lowest percentages (below 10%). In 
sum, Figure 1 indicates that (at least at the aggregated level) there is not a clear pattern of 
differences in the degree of public support for cuts in unemployment benefits by welfare 
regime type. This result suggests that the institutional characteristics of the Welfare state do 
not necessarily influence individual attitudes in a homogeneous way across countries.  
 
Let us now turn to the discussion about the operationalization of the dependent 
variable. Here we want to justify why we have estimated an empirical model of public 
support for a reduction in levels of unemployment benefits spending, rather than public 
support for unemployment benefits (positively) as the literature often does. The original 
variable used to measure the degree of public support for unemployment benefits is an 
ordinal one. However, its substantive interpretation is not clear from a comparative 
perspective. Consider, for instance, the third category in which respondents state that their 
respective governments should spend the same on unemployment benefits as they are already 
spending. Should we interpret this answer as an indication of public support for 
                                               
4 Variation coefficients are computed as the ratio of the standard deviation over the mean and expressed 
as a percentage.  
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unemployment benefits? Obviously, the response to this question is contingent on the 
socioeconomic context of each country. 5 
 
 
Figure 1. Public opinion on unemployment benefits spending across OECD countries  
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Source: International Social Survey, 1996-7 
 
 
 
Due to these problems, we have preferred to estimate public support for cuts in levels 
of unemployment benefits spending, since we believe it is a clear way to measure the degree 
of public support for unemployment protection (even if following the reverse logic) that is 
not contingent on the socio economic context of each country. In the era of welfare states 
resilience, some authors have proposed to change the predominant view on political economy 
which explores the potential determinants of welfare states expansion. Nowadays, the 
                                               
5 Take, for instance, a British, an Italian, French, and a Swedish citizen. The four of them think that their 
respective governments should spend about the same money on unemployment benefits. But it cannot be argued 
that they all equally support unemployment benefits, since those benefits are scarce in Italy and Great Britain 
but generous in France and Sweden. 
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literature claims to investigate what has been called the political economy of welfare states 
retrenchment (Pierson, 1996). We propose to also incorporate this view into the literature of 
public opinion on welfare programmes.  
 
In sum, we have created a dichotomous dependent variable that takes the value 1 when 
respondents think that their respective governments should spend less or much less on 
unemployment benefits (and this is substantively interpreted as support for retrenchment) and 
0 for the remaining of opinions (interpreted as non-clear support for cuts in public spending 
on unemployment protection). Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable we 
have estimated a comparative model of public support for cuts in unemployment benefits 
spending through logistic regression6. We have considered the following independent 
variables. First, at the individual level, gender is a dummy variable codified as 1 for men; age 
is specified in its original scale (years); income as an ordinal variable contrasting those in the 
bottom quartile of equivalized family income distribution (for each respective country), those 
in the two middle quartiles of the distribution, and those in the top quartile; education is an 
ordinal variable going from 1 (minimum level of education) to 6 (maximum level of 
education); labour market position is operationalised through a series of dummy variables 
contrasting those who are unemployed, retired, and are never in the labour market 
(housewife, students) with those employed (that is, the category of reference when estimating 
the other three categories’ coefficients).  
 
Finally, in the data base used for this article the standard self-positioning ideological 
scale is not available. Hence, we have reconstructed individuals’ ideology by using the 
                                               
6 An alternative equation has been estimated by using the technique of multinomial logit in order to test 
whether the differences between the intermediate category of the original dependent variable and the category of 
lack of support for cuts in unemployment benefits’ spending create any kind of bias in the results. None of these 
tests suggest that the estimates of the simplest binomial logit are biased. Moreover, we have estimated the same 
equation through the multilevel technique and the results (available to the interested reader) were quite similar. 
We are aware of the drawback associated with not accounting for the two-level hierarchical structure of the data. 
Basically, the coefficients corresponding to the contextual factors may be biased, and lead to potential under or 
overestimation problems (Snijders and Boskers, 1999). However, we have preferred to present the simplest 
results of the logistic regression because the multilevel equation is not without problems in this case. We have 
only thirteen cases at the aggregated level, and standard methodologies assume at least thirty or more cases at 
the aggregated level. 
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ideology of the party that respondents declare to have voted for in the last election.7 With this 
information we obtained a set of dummy variables contrasting those voting for a party 
positioned in the centre of the political spectrum with those on the right and those on the left 
(that is, the category of reference when estimating the coefficients of the other three 
categories) We have also included a category called “others” in order to avoid losing too 
many cases of individuals who do not answer the vote question in the questionnaire. This 
coefficient, however, does not have a substantive interpretation, since we do not know the 
ideology of these individuals.  
 
Second, at the aggregated level, we have specified three independent variables. The 
first variable operationalises the type of welfare regime. We have classified the 13 countries 
analysed here according to Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime revised typology (Esping-
Andersen 1999). Therefore, we have four different groups: liberal welfare states (Australia, 
Canada ,Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United States), continental welfare 
states (France and Germany), universalistic welfare states (Norway, and Sweden), and finally 
“familiaristic” welfare states (Italy and Spain). We have also included Japan in this last 
category, since the family is considered to have an important role in providing social 
protection to citizens.  
 
The second and third variables consist of two aggregated measures: cross-country long-
term unemployment rate as given by the OECD, and an index of unemployment generosity. 
As explained before, this index consists of the average of two measures: the rate of 
unemployment benefits replacement as given by the OECD (OECD employment Outlook, 
1997), and the maximum period for which full benefits are typically available to unemployed 
people (in months) as given by Social Security programs throughout the World, and 
MISSOC, 1995 and 1997. Descriptive statistics regarding all these variables used in the 
empirical estimation of public support for cuts in unemployment benefits spending are given 
in Table 1. 
                                               
7 More specifically, we have used the information coming from the original question V247 in the 
questionnaire where political parties have been classified in the political spectrum. For the case of the sample 
corresponding to Italy, there was no such question available. Therefore, we have first classified the party that 
citizens declare to have voted for in the last election into the right, centre, and left of the political space by 
considering the characteristics of the Italian political system, and then attributed to individuals such ideology. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables (N = 13678) 
 
 Mean SD Min. Max. 
Dependent variable  
Support for cuts in levels of  unemployment 
benefits spending 
 
0.22 
 
0.42 
 
0 
 
1 
Individual characteristics     
Gender 0.51 0.5 0 1 
Age  45.9 16.8 16 97 
Income 1.97 0.71 1 3 
Level of education 4.59 1.42 1 7 
Labour market position  
(original codification) 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Retired 
Others (not in the labour force) 
 
1.99 
0.56 
0.05 
0.21 
0.17 
 
1.21 
0.49 
0.22 
0.41 
0.37 
 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Ideology (original codification) 
1 Left 
2 Centre 
3 Right 
4 Others 
2.37 
0.33 
0.17 
0.29 
0.21 
1.14 
0.47 
0.37 
0.45 
0.41 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 Country characteristics  
(N = 13) 
    
Type of welfare regime  
(original codification) 
1 Liberal 
2 Continental 
3 Universal 
4 Familiaristic-Japan 
 
2.23 
0.41 
0.19 
0.14 
0.25 
 
1.23 
0.49 
0.39 
0.34 
0.43 
 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Long-term unemployment rate 9 5.1 2.5 19.8 
Benefit replacement ratio 25.63 8.6 7 39 
Maximum duration of unemployment 
benefits (in months) 
28.55 19.6 6 60 
Index of generosity of benefits  412.58 328.06 21 1110 
Sources: ISSP 1996-97, OECD Employment Outlook, Social Security Programs throughout the World, 
MISSOC, 1996. 
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4.  Discussion of the results  
 
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Table 2, the first column of which  
presents the independent variables in each of the estimated equations. Model 1 contains all 
the individual factors plus a set of dummy variables representing different types of welfare 
state regime. This might be considered as the traditional institutionalist approach. Model 2 
adds to the equation the generosity of unemployment benefits’ index, and the long-term 
unemployment rate. As previously explained, the aim of this second model is to disentangle 
the potential causal mechanisms linking types of welfare regimen with public opinion on 
unemployment benefits retrenchment. Finally, Model 3 includes a statistically significant 
interaction term between the generosity of unemployment benefits’ index and the 
unemployment rate. This constitutes empirical evidence demonstrating that when the 
unemployment problem is high and persistent, citizens (independently of their own individual 
characteristics) have more concern for those unemployed, and this can potentially neutralise 
their negative predisposition to pay taxes in order to finance generous unemployment 
protection.  
 
The second, third, and fourth columns of Table 2 provide, therefore, the parameter 
estimates and associated standard errors as estimated by logit regressions for Model 1, 2, and 
3. In what follows, we discuss these results. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the coefficients of the independent variables are all correctly 
signed and (almost all) statistically significant as we expected from a theoretical point of 
view, and present a picture in which those citizens that look more like potential consumers of 
unemployment benefits show a lower propensity to support cuts in public spending on such a 
social policy. We start by commenting briefly on the main findings of the individual-level 
determinants that are very stable across the three models included in Table 2. In short, men 
present a higher propensity to sustain cuts in unemployment benefits spending than women, 
whereas one additional year of age is negatively associated with support for a retrenchment in 
unemployment protection8. Additionally, those who are unemployed show a negative effect 
                                               
8 Recall that the age coefficient represents a one year effect; for this reason the magnitude of the 
coefficient seems to be negligible, but in fact it is not.  
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Table 2. Empirical results. Individual and contextual determinants of public support for 
unemployment benefits retrenchment 
 
Independent variables  Model 1 (traditional 
institutionalist 
approach) 
Model 2 (Model 
1+aggregated 
mechanisms) 
Model 3 (Model 2 + 
Interaction term) 
 
Intercept 
 
-2,13 (0,16) ** 
 
-2,0 (0,16) ** 
 
-2,77 (0,25) ** 
Male 0,33 (0,04) ** 0,35 (0,04) ** 0,35 (0,04) ** 
Age  -0,007 (0,001) * 0,01 (0,001) ** 0,01 (0,001) ** 
Income 0,28 (0,03) ** 0,28 (0,03) ** 0,28 (0,03) ** 
Level of education 0,03 (0,01) + 0,03 (0,01) + 0,04 (0,01) * 
Labour market position: 1 
Unemployed 
Retired 
Others (not in the lf) 
 
-0,93 (0,13) ** 
-0,16 (0,06) ** 
-0,06 (0,08) 
 
-0,95 (0,13) ** 
-0,15 (0,06) * 
-0,07 (0,08) 
 
-0,95 (0,13) ** 
-0,15 (0,06) * 
-0,07 (0,08) 
Ideology: 2 
2 (centre) 
3 (right) 
4 (others) 
 
 
0,55 (0,06) ** 
1,11 (0,05) ** 
0,23 (0,07) ** 
 
0,76 (0,06) ** 
1,08 (0,05) ** 
0,34 (0,07) ** 
 
0,76 (0,06) ** 
1,08 (0,05) ** 
0,36 (0,07) ** 
 
Type of welfare regime:3 
Continental 
Universalistic 
Familiaristic + Japan 
 
 
-0,83 (0,06) ** 
-1,95 (0,11) ** 
-0,29 (0,08) ** 
 
 
-0,61 (0,06) ** 
-1,05 (0,07) ** 
-0,35 (0,07) ** 
 
 
 
-0,54 (0,06) ** 
-1,20 (0,08) ** 
-0,21 (0,08) * 
 
Long term unemployment rate  
------------- 
 
 
-0,06 (0,006) ** 
 
0,02 (0,02) 
 
Generosity of benefits 
 
 
------------ 
 
 
0,03 (0,001) ** 
 
0,067 (0,008) ** 
Generosity of benefits* 
Unemployment rate 
 
------------ 
 
------------ 
 
-0,004(0,0009)** 
 
LR Chi2 
 
1523,4(Prob>Chi2 = 
0,0000) 
 
1661,1(Prob>Chi2= 
0,0000) 
 
1676,25(Prob>Chi2= 
0,0000) 
 
% Correctly Predicted 
 
 
76% 
 
78% 
 
78% 
Note: Entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated asymptotic standard errors in 
parentheses. 
** significant at the level of 99%, * significant at the level of 95%, + significant at the level of 90%. 
1-reference category = employed; 2- reference category = left; 3- reference category = liberal welfare states 
 
 
on the support for unemployment benefits retrenchment in comparison to those who are 
employed. This suggests that in fact citizens make an egocentric economic calculation when 
expressing their support for cuts in unemployment benefits spending. And the same causal 
mechanism can be referred to in order to understand the significant coefficients 
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corresponding to education and income. Thus, higher levels of education and income are 
positively associated with support for a reduction in the level of unemployment protection 
spending. Finally, citizens voting for centre and especially right political parties in contrast to 
those voting for left parties, have a positive incidence on the chances for supporting cuts in 
unemployment benefits spending. This constitutes additional empirical evidence showing that 
left-wing citizens tend to be more supportive of unemployment benefits. 
 
The second set of relevant coefficients are the contextual determinants of public 
support for unemployment benefits retrenchment. The second column of Table 2 provides 
empirical evidence supporting the institutionalist approach. This implies that as the previous 
literature has demonstrated, the historical role of the state in each country is an important 
predictor of subjective views about unemployment benefits. Moreover, citizens living in 
universalistic, continental, and familiaristic welfare regimes show a lower propensity to 
sustain unemployment protection retrenchment in comparison to citizens living in liberal 
welfare regimes. The coefficient of universalistic welfare regimes compared to liberal welfare 
regimes displays the strongest negative effect in our model. Countries belonging to 
continental or familiaristic welfare regimes, compared to liberal welfare regimes, also display 
a negative effect, albeit minor, to sustain cuts in unemployment benefits spending.  
 
This empirical evidence about the link between types of welfare regime and public 
opinion on cuts in unemployment benefits spending is, however, only an indication of 
subgroup differences, but it does not explain why the logit regression coefficients for each 
type of welfare regime are different and statistically significant. It provides sparse 
information about micro-macro relationships. In short, the type of welfare regime appears as 
a “black box”, without any explanation of the causal mechanisms that might influence 
individuals at the macro level. The next step is, then, to specify other macro-level factors. 
This is what can be seen in the third column of Table 2 (Model 2).  
 
The effects of the type of welfare state remain quite consistent when we introduce in 
the analysis the other two aggregated factors, although the magnitude of the coefficients 
decreases. Table 2, therefore, provides empirical evidence showing that public opinion on 
unemployment protection is shaped by the other two contextual factors that are characteristics 
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of each type of welfare regime. Moreover, high levels of generosity in unemployment 
benefits are indeed positively associated with support for cuts in unemployment benefits 
spending. Two lines of thinking may be simultaneously explaining the positive coefficient 
regarding the generosity of unemployment protection. On the one hand, generous 
unemployment benefits might be financed by high taxes paid mainly by those in the labour 
market. On the other hand, generous unemployment benefits decrease the incentives of 
individuals to look for another job.  
 
These effects might be, however, compensated by the negative coefficient associated 
with the long term unemployment rate. Furthermore, citizens living in countries where the 
level of unemployment is high show a lower propensity to sustain cuts in unemployment 
protection spending than citizens living in countries where the level of unemployment is low. 
This means that unemployment has an impact on attitudes towards cuts in unemployment 
benefits spending both at the individual and at the contextual level. Accordingly, citizens 
engage not only in egocentric economic calculi (that is, whether or not they are at the risk of 
being unemployed) but also in a sociotropic calculi (that is, a general concern about the 
seriousness of the social problem, that makes citizens more supportive of unemployment 
protection, independently of their own chances of being unemployed in the coming future). 
 
So far, we have commented on the results of our empirical analysis in a rather crude 
way. Let us now emphasize the effect of these two contextual factors. The coefficients 
provided in Table 2 do not yet indicate the magnitude of the effect of each independent 
variable on the probability of each given citizen supporting unemployment protection 
retrenchment. Figure 2, however, provides this information. It translates the logit coefficients 
into real probabilities by way of simulations. Given the continuous nature of these two 
independent variables, we provide a figure to show the magnitude of the effect of these two 
variables on the probabilities for an “average citizen”9 to support cuts in unemployment 
benefits spending. The first comment to be made is that according to our estimation, there 
                                               
9 Even if not very straightforward for the case of discrete independent variables, we have preferred to 
hold constant at their sample mean values the rest of the independent variables (both at the individual and at the 
aggregated levels) included in the equation of Model 2 in both Figures 2 and 3, since this is what we consider to 
be the most neutral values for the simulation exercise.  
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seems to be a general approval of unemployment protection, since the expected probabilities 
of supporting reductions in the level of unemployment benefits spending for the “average 
citizen”-that is, the one presenting the sample mean values- is low, and always below 50% 
(see the vertical axis of Figure 2). Additionally, and as can be seen in Figure 2, there is a clear 
increase in the predicted probabilities of an “average citizen” supporting unemployment 
benefits retrenchment as the generosity of unemployment benefits increases. The reverse 
effect can also be seen for the line corresponding to the seriousness of the unemployment 
problem. Moreover, there is a clear decrease in the predicted probabilities of the same 
“average citizen” supporting cuts in unemployment benefits spending as the structural 
unemployment rate increases.  
 
 
Figure 2. The effect of the generosity of unemployment benefits and the structural unemployment rate 
on the predicted probabilities of an “average citizen” supporting cuts in unemployment benefits 
spending 
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Note: Calculations have been made through the equation of Model 2 in Table 2. All independent variables 
(except the two plotted in the figure) are held at their mean sample value. 
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Hence, we have demonstrated that there are two contextual significant effects at the 
aggregated level that present different signs. Additionally, we have suggested that the 
positive effect of the generosity of unemployment benefits might be compensated for by a 
high unemployment rate. To illustrate this possibility, we have replicated the same exercise 
as in Figure 2, but this time plotting the effect of the generosity index on the predicted 
probabilities of an “average citizen” supporting cuts in unemployment benefits spending, and 
for different values of the structural unemployment rate. This can be seen in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. The effect of the generosity of unemployment benefits on the predicted probabilities of an “average 
citizen” supporting cuts in unemployment benefits spending for different values of the structural unemployment 
rate.  
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Note: Calculations have been made through the equation of Model 2 in Table 2. All independent variables 
(except the two plotted in the figure) are held at their mean sample value. 
 
 
Compare, for instance, the line corresponding to the effect of the generosity index on 
the predicted probabilities to support unemployment protection retrenchment for an “average 
citizen” living in the country presenting the lowest structural unemployment rate of the 
sample (Japan) with the line corresponding to the same effect but for an “average citizen” 
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living in the country presenting the highest structural unemployment rate of the sample 
(Spain). It seems clear that the magnitude of the effect is higher in Japan than in Spain. In 
fact, the minimum expected probabilities of supporting unemployment protection 
retrenchment for our “average citizen” in Japan is 15% (for the minimum value of the 
generosity index) whereas the maximum expected probabilities (for the maximum value of 
the generosity index ) for the same citizen is 46% (see the vertical axis of Figure 3). This 
represents a difference of 31% in the predicted probabilities. 10In contrast, the same 
differences in the predicted probabilities for our average citizen in Spain are only 17% (that 
is, 22% of maximum predicted probabilities minus 5% of minimum predicted probabilities).  
 
This result suggests that the magnitude of the positive effect of the generosity index on 
the chances of supporting cuts in unemployment benefits spending might be conditioned by 
the seriousness of the unemployment problem. We have tested this last possibility in a 
statistically rigorous way by specifying an interaction term between the two contextual 
variables (that is, structural unemployment and the generosity index) in the estimation 
equation. Results can be seen in the fourth column of Table 2, and show that the aggregated 
effect of the generosity of unemployment benefits on public opinion about their retrenchment 
is conditioned by the seriousness of the unemployment problem (the long term 
unemployment rate). The coefficient corresponding to the interaction term is statistically 
significant.  
 
As can be seen in Table 2 (last column), a negative and significant coefficient 
corresponding to the interaction term indicates that the positive incidence of generosity of 
unemployment benefits on the chances of supporting their retrenchment might be of smaller 
magnitude as the value of the unemployment rate increases. The other two coefficients 
corresponding to the main effect of the generosity index and the unemployment rate are not 
directly interpretable, since both variables do not present an actual value equal to 0. To better 
interpret the results of the interaction term, we have calculated the coefficient of the 
generosity index conditioned by the actual maximum, mean, and minimum value of the 
structural unemployment rate in the sample. In this way, the coefficients corresponding to the 
                                               
10 In formal terms, this constitutes the so-called ‘first difference’ that equals to: Ê (Ymax)-Ê (Ymim) (King 
1989). 
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two aggregated variables (that often are called the “main effect”) have a substantive and 
direct meaning when the interaction term is specified in the equation. The results of this 
exercise are summarised in Table 3.11 
 
 
Table 3. Interpreting the results of the interaction term included in the equation (see last column of 
Table 2 for the rest of the equation’s results) 
 
 Coefficients conditioned 
to the actual minimum 
value of the sample of the 
two variables 
Coefficients conditioned to 
the actual mean value of 
the sample of the two 
variables 
Coefficients conditioned to 
the actual maximum value 
of the sample of the two 
variables 
 
Intercept 
 
 
-2,34  (0,18)** 
 
-1,69  (0,14)** 
 
-2,79  (0,34)** 
 
Structural 
Unemployment 
 
 
 
-0,001  (0,01) 
 
 
-0,08  (0,008)** 
 
 
-0,16  (0,02)** 
 
Generosity  
of unemployment 
benefits 
 
 
 
0,057  (0,005)** 
 
 
0,03  (0,002)** 
 
 
-0,01  (0,11) 
 
Interaction term 
 
 
-0,004  (0,0009)** 
 
-0,004  (0,0009)** 
 
-0,004  (0,0009)** 
 
Note: This table shows only the coefficients which value change depending on the value at which they are 
conditioned in the calculation (obviously, apart from the interaction term that remains identical through the 
whole exercise) . The rest of the coefficients corresponding to the other independent variables included in the 
equation as given in the last column of Table 2 remain the same. Hence, we prefer not to include them in order 
to simplify the interpretation of this table.  
 
Entries are logit maximum-likelihood estimates and their associated asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
** significant at the level of 99%, * significant at the level of 95%, + significant at the level of 90%. 
 
                                               
11 This is done by a linear transformation of the two variables included in the interaction term. For 
example, when calculating the coefficient conditioned on the maximum actual sample value of the two variables 
that comprise the interaction term, we proceeded in the following way. For the two variables we take their old 
value minus their maximum value. Hence, the coefficient corresponding to the transformed generosity index 
indicates its incidence on the chances of supporting cuts in unemployment benefits spending when the structural 
unemployment presents its highest level, while the coefficient of the transformed structural unemployment 
variable indicates its corresponding incidence on the probabilities of sustaining unemployment protection 
retrenchment when the generosity of unemployment benefits also presents its highest level. The same logic 
applies for the other two calculations given in Table 3 (that is, the calculation of the coefficients conditioned on 
the mean and minimum values of the two variables). 
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We will concentrate our comments on the fourth row of Table 3, since it provides the 
coefficients corresponding to the generosity index. More specifically, the second column of 
Table 3 gives the coefficient of the generosity index conditioned by the actual minimum 
value of the structural unemployment rate in the sample. It turns out to be statistically 
significant and of greater magnitude than the non conditioned coefficient as given in Model 2 
of Table 2 (that is, 0,057 versus 0,03). This suggests that the incidence of  the generosity of 
unemployment benefits on the chances of supporting their retrenchment is of higher 
magnitude when the unemployment problem is not really serious. The magnitude of this 
effect, however, seems to decrease as the seriousness of the unemployment problem 
increases.  
 
Compare the last coefficient (0,057) with the one given in the third column that has 
been calculated conditioned to the actual mean value of the structural unemployment rate in 
the sample. This second coefficient is also significant and positive but its magnitude 
decreases greatly (0,03), since the unemployment rate now is fixed at a higher value (the 
mean). What is more interesting for our discussion, however, is the coefficient provided in 
the last column of Table 3. It is negative but did not turn out to be statistically significant. 
What this result suggests is that in contexts where the unemployment problem is serious and 
persistent, the generosity of unemployment protection might not have any significant 
incidence on public opinion at the aggregated level. Therefore citizens in advanced capitalist 
countries, when expressing their opinion on the level of unemployment protection spending, 
seem to consider simultaneously not only how much they have to pay in order to finance 
potential generous unemployment protection, but also whether this protection is necessary or 
not in their society as a whole.  
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this article we have explored the individual and contextual determinants of public 
support for cuts in levels of unemployment benefits spending following a comparative 
approach. The main conclusion that emerges from the substantive discussion presented here 
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is that the traditional literature studying the determinants of public support for welfare 
programmes have offered a rather simple picture of the contextual factors shaping public 
opinion at the aggregated level. We argue that previous literature has failed to provide 
explanations about the potential causal mechanisms linking the institutional characteristics of 
welfare policies to public opinion. Moreover, in explaining public support for social 
programmes, it seems crucial to investigate the process by which the institutional 
characteristics of the welfare state influence public opinion at the aggregated level. 
 
In this article we propose two innovations in handling the comparative data on public 
opinion about welfare state spending. First, we estimate public support for cuts in levels of 
unemployment benefits spending rather than public support for unemployment benefits 
(positively). In line with the innovations of the political economy literature which nowadays 
investigates the potential determinants of welfare states retrenchment (Pierson, 1996), we 
claim the need to also study public opinion on welfare states retrenchment.  
 
Additionally, we also claim that in explaining public support for social spending 
retrenchment, additional factors may be considered if we aspire to understand the process 
through which welfare policies might shape public opinion. For the specific case of a targeted 
social programme such as unemployment benefits, we propose to consider two causal 
mechanisms that potentially account for the capacity of unemployment protection to shape 
public opinion at the aggregated level.  
 
The two main aggregated factors proposed are the generosity of unemployment 
protection, and the seriousness of the unemployment problem. We provide empirical 
evidence showing that these additional factors should be systematically considered if we want 
to understand the process by which social policies might shape public opinion. Even if the 
results are tentative, since we have too few cases at the aggregated level (only 13), we believe 
they open the “black box of welfare types” that until very recently has been the predominant 
explanation when accounting for aggregated variation in public opinion on welfare states.  
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All in all, our claim is that an innovation is needed in the literature that has insisted too 
much on the institutional factors, while leaving under-considered welfare state’s outcomes, 
citizens experiences about them, as well as their concern about the seriousness of the problem 
that social policies aspire to alleviate. 
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